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Abstract 
 
 
Network governance of collective learning processes is an essential approach to sustainable 
development. The first section of the article briefly refers to recent theories about both market 
and government failures that express scepticism about the way framework conditions for 
market actors are set. For this reason, the development of networks for collective learning 
processes seems advantageous if new solutions are to be developed in policy areas concerned 
with long-term changes and a stepwise internalisation of externalities. With regard to 
corporate actors’ interests, the article shows recent insights from theories about the 
knowledge-based firm, where the creation of new knowledge is based on the absorption of 
societal views. This concept shifts the focus towards knowledge generation as an essential 
element in the evolution of sustainable markets. This involves at the same time the 
development of new policies. In this context innovation-inducing regulation is suggested and 
discussed. 
The evolution of the Swedish, German and Dutch wind turbine industries are analysed based 
on the approach of governance put forward in this article. We conclude that these co-
evolutionary mechanisms may take for granted some of the stabilising and orientating 
functions previously exercised by basic regulatory activities of the state. In this context, the 
main function of the governments is to facilitate learning processes that depart from the 
government functions suggested by welfare economics. 
 
 
Keywords: knowledge creation, knowledge-based firm, networks, regulation, collective 
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1. Introduction 
Our article proposes the following thesis: Governance of sustainable development goes well 
beyond traditional, state-centred policy-making because it aims at pro-active changes of the 
behaviour of private actors at different levels. It necessarily involves the lower levels of 
policy-making and the activities of private individuals in policy formulation and 
implementation. Innovations generate positive externalities, which enable corporate actors to 
play a public role while doing business on competitive markets. The notions of networks and 
collective learning we put forward in this article do accept profit seeking in emerging markets 
for sustainability. They further identify this behaviour as a driving force towards policy 
integration and the internalisation of externalities. Motivated by self-interest and soft 
incentives, corporate actors transform areas into markets for sustainable development that 
were previously a part of the public domain. However, the state retains the responsibility for 
structural conditions and innovation-inducing regulations. 
 
To test this thesis the article discusses the following questions: 
 
• What exactly is the function of networks and regulation? 
• What are the characteristics of a system that develops synergies between political and 
corporate governance? 
• If corporate players can play a public role, which conclusions can be drawn for policy 
makers? 
 
Methodologically, this article refers to recent theories from both political science and 
economics. The analyses in the discipline of political science look at governance systems with 
less government activity (Héritier 2002; Majone 1998; Young 1999) while the economic 
analyses offer findings on firms, market failures and regulatory theories (Williamson 1999; 
Nelson 2002; Stiglitz 2000). This interdisciplinary approach is valuable because political 
science has a strong interest in administration and policy-making, especially in the field of 
institutionalism that is actor-centred. Within the economic analyses, the emerging branches of 
New Institutional Economics and Evolutionary Economics prove to be helpful. The analytical 
framework derived from these theories departs from models of rational choice, i.e. it does not 
assume a fully rational actor with perfect information (Ostrom 1998; Mantzavinos 2002). 
Recent literature on corporate governance is of special relevance here as it provides insights 
into the motivation and self-interest of firms. This in turn is helpful for the (new) design and 
reform of policies. 
 
In section 2 we will give a short survey of theories on market and government failures. It is 
proposed that both types of failures can be compensated between private and public actors in 
the development of sustainable markets. Section 3 outlines a more evolutionary approach on 
firms and markets. Section 4 deals with the policy-level while in section 5 we describe a case 
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study on wind energy in three EU Member States. Section 6 draws conclusions on 
governance. 
2. Network governance as a response to market and hierarchy failures 
Markets are well known for being dynamic and powerful, yet imperfect. These imperfections 
also have been described as market failures. However, not only the market but also 
government failures are a field of research for political scientists and economists. Within the 
sustainability debate the hierarchical mode of failures or inadequacies of the government to 
bring about changes are widely discussed. In this part of the article the market and the 
hierarchy, the two most dominant forms of government and their failure to bring about 
sustainability improvements are discussed. Subsequently, co-operative governance structures 
between private and public actors will be presented as a possible solution to correct both these 
forms of government failures. 
 
Market failures 
Markets are often considered to be unable to contribute to sustainability improvements 
because such improvements have public goods characteristics. They are incompatible with the 
mandate of profit seeking in a pure free market economy. Public goods are defined as being 
non-exclusive and non-rival. A good is non-exclusive if nobody can be excluded from the 
benefits of its use. Further, the good is said to be non-rival if the consumption of one unit of 
the good does not lower the consumption opportunities still available to others (Sandler, 
1992:6). These attributes of non-rivalry and non-excludability make private production of 
these goods unattractive. However, this standard concept of public goods can be problematic 
(Nelson 2002). The attributes may change due to technological progress.4 Although citizens 
are usually taken as one aggregated unit, they benefit from public goods in innumerable 
different ways. Preferences are often heterogeneous and change over time. The assumption of 
a fixed borderline between private and public goods seems no longer tenable. In fact, the 
borderline can be argued to be blurred. At the same time sustainability improvements 
frequently result in certain private benefits (e.g. higher levels of efficiency, lower total costs 
and a green image). It is more appropriate to regard improvements in sustainability as an 
impure collective good of the so-called joint product variety.5 Such a conceptualisation 
provides a new perspective on the roles of public and private actors in the field of sustainable 
development. 
 
The notion of externalities raises further questions. Third parties that so far have not been 
involved can be affected by internalisation efforts within Coase-type negotiations. 
Governments have to serve their respective voters and may tend towards decision-making in 
favour of certain interest groups. This might lead them to overlook vulnerable groups inside 
and outside of the society that are only modestly organised. Participation is a topic of 
internalisation strategies that has merits also in other areas of sustainability. Its relevance 
becomes even clearer when we look at the openness of technological change (Freeman 1998), 
where mechanisms for absorbing new knowledge are crucial. The acknowledgment that firms 
                                                 
4 The examples lighthouses illustrate such a conversion from a former public to a private good due to 
technological improvements and better pricing possibilities. They have been mostly replaced by modern 
navigation systems which are required by law and which are provided by private companies. 
5 A collective good can be defined as a joint product, where the collective activities result in a multiple output. 
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pursue these interests of knowledge transformation into business concepts creates the scope 
for an endogenous internalisation of externalities. 
 
The category of information and adaptation deficits refers to the speed at which markets and 
firms adapt to new circumstances that arise from new legislation and other exogenous factors. 
The field of evolutionary economics has shown that markets evolve step by step (Witt 2003; 
Pelikan / Wegner 2003), created by pioneers and early imitators from a variety of firms. 
However, in the evolution of markets stakeholders are at least as important as the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur. In fact stakeholders are central information carriers for the 
learning processes that drives the evolution of markets. Stakeholder involvement is therefore 
a key to reduce the information and adaptation deficits. 
 
Based on this overview of different market failures it can be concluded that the correction of 
unsustainable market behaviour is often a question of learning processes that involve a variety 
of actors. Collective learning processes, new products and technologies that bring about 
private and public benefits can be developed through the involvement of different 
stakeholders. In other words, collective learning processes should be seen as a key factor for 
the internalisation of externalities and for the provision of collective goods. Therefore, the 
development of collective learning processes and stakeholder involvement should be a focal 
point in the governance of sustainable development. 
 
The failures of hierarchy 
This article proposes that co-operation between private and public actors in the development 
of learning processes is essential for sustainability improvements as it responds to a central 
weakness of hierarchical governance. The problem goes beyond the too simplistic general 
view of public choice theories. The fact is that economic actors, and also politicians and 
bureaucrats, are driven by self-interest. This provides at least some initial insights on why 
public policies are likely to involve failures (Buchanan / Musgrave 1999). In this context, 
hierarchical top-down regulation may have been designed without the knowledge of the 
interests and knowledge of the actors and processes in the local networks where the real 
changes take place. Such forms of regulation can lead to dissatisfaction, conflicts and spore 
behaviour of self-interest both by private and public actors. 
 
Command-and-control is an example for hierarchical governance. It is often defined as legally 
mandated standards that are enacted by a series of agency decisions that are enforced by local 
authorities. In her analysis of German water and air pollution controls Mayntz (1978) 
concludes that the environmental standards do not automatically result in the assumed target 
group behaviour. Further she argues that control, monitoring activities and prosecution of 
violators are necessary for the effectiveness of such a regulation. However, the possibilities of 
the public to execute such a required control are limited. For this reason many polluters 
choose the risk of not complying with the standards. 
 
The top-down approaches have been criticised in the general political debate because of their 
implicit assumption that public authorities control the organisational, political, and technical 
processes affecting implementation. Similarly, the approach fails to acknowledge the 
importance of the interaction between bureaucrats, target groups, and other private 
associations. The knowledge of actual problems these groups have, should be put to use by 
the top-level of the hierarchy (Enevoldsen 2001:88; Jordan / Wurzel / Zito 2003; Pelikan / 
Wegner 2003). 
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The development of co-operative institutions for collective learning processes 
The possession of knowledge of private and public actors can be seen as a central reason for 
the existence of policy networks. Policy networks are therefore proposed as a mode of 
governance (Börzel 1998; Kenis / Schneider 1991). During the last decade a development and 
strengthening of the societal organisational structures outside of the state hierarchy has been 
witnessed (Kenis / Schneider 1991). More resources have come under control or were 
produced by private organisations. These changes have developed alongside the growth of 
new technologies, products and services. This has resulted in higher levels of complexities 
within policy making. These complexities require knowledge, expertise and access to 
resources beyond the scope of public actors. As a consequence, governments have become 
increasingly dependent upon co-operation and joint resource mobilisation between policy 
actors from sectors outside of the traditional hierarchical control of governments (Börzel 
1998:260). These changes have favoured the emergence of policy networks as a new form of 
governance. These new forms of governance are different from the two conventional forms of 
governance (namely market and hierarchy). These two conventional forms allow governments 
to mobilise political resources in situations where resources are widely dispersed between 
public and private actors (Börzel 1998). 
 
On the one hand, we agree with the view that the development of networks between private 
and public actors is central for the co-ordination and mobilisation of resources necessary for 
the implementation of profound change. On the other hand, we see the co-operation between 
private and public actors as the central argument for the development of learning processes 
that, we suggest, is a key factor to sustainability improvements. In actor centred 
institutionalism interests are treated as exogenous. If preferences are treated as given, 
however, one fails to recognise learning processes as a central driver behind change. In the 
approach presented in this article it is assumed that learning processes can alter the interests 
and preferences of actors. This is why we argue that the generation of collective learning 
processes should be a central pillar in governance strategies. 
 
However, market development instead of policy implementation is the aim of the kind of 
networks proposed in this article. This concept has an influence on the composition of 
networks and the issues discussed. The networks we analyse deal with the strategic issue of 
bringing economic activities on (transition) paths towards sustainability. It is not the aim of 
the networks to seek strategic influence on the ongoing national and/or local political agenda. 
Networks of this type will be made up by business and political actors and consumer groups 
(both on the decentral and central level). In those networks public policy acts only as a 
participant but not as a centre of hierarchical control. It can provide insider information on 
possible regulatory trends both within the EU and on the Member State level in order to lower 
transaction costs. (Dror 2001; Stiglitz 1998; Pelikan / Wegner 2003; Young 1999). 
 
From this viewpoint, the traditional dichotomy between the market and the government, or 
between laissez-faire and intervention, looses importance. The market and the state serve 
complementary functions that keep the system running. A well-performing market economy 
is a mixed composition of government regulation and (free) markets. Langlois and Robertson 
(1995) formulate similar views on business institutions.6 Governance towards sustainability is 
                                                 
6 See further North (1990), Pelikan / Wegner (2003). 
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a co-evolution between the market and the state, where private and public actors search 
permanently for market and policy improvements. 
 
3. Firms and Market Evolution 
How does the behaviour of profit maximisation of firms fit into the approach of collective 
learning described above? What is the interest of firms to engage in such forms of co-
operation and why would they not defect if it would pay off? Indeed, this might well be the 
case. Corporate behaviour is unlikely to become benevolent for society as a whole or for the 
global commons. Still the “shadow of the law” is one option for policies that will reduce the 
likeliness that corporate actors will defect from such relations (Scharpf 1997, Börzel 1998). 
Another – and perhaps more important – point is that in many cases it proves profitable to 
develop new technologies, products and services which result in sustainability improvements 
(Weizäcker et al. 1997). In other words, profit seeking can go hand in hand with sustainability 
improvements. The following section explains why. 
 
Recent economic analysis (Nelson 2002) reveals a shift in the corporate behaviour driven by 
profit maximisation. Previously it was quite naturally assumed that businesses are motivated 
by profits and an optimisation process alongside a sharply defined set of opportunities. Firms 
were not regarded as groping, experimenting and gradually innovating towards incremental 
improvements. The idea was that profits were predetermined by the given set of total average 
cost, marginal revenues and technological choices. The role of the management consisted in 
an optimisation towards the market equilibrium. Such companies would obviously have no 
interest in a contribution towards public goods or the internalisation of externalities. 
 
However, this kind of model could not account for the dynamics of competition and 
knowledge generation. More recent theories establish an analytical model of knowledge-
based firms (Leonard-Barton 1995; Langlois / Robertson 1995; Grant 1996; Nonaka / Toyama 
2002). It is assumed that firms act under uncertainties and information deficits. They rely on 
permanent knowledge generation provided by outside sources, experiments or internal 
implementation processes. At times, firms might be able to create markets from scratch 
through coordination with others along vertical or horizontal lines. In doing so, firms 
communicate with stakeholders in order to learn about changes in demand and the 
development of useful goods and services on the one hand, and to avoid hostile reactions, on 
the other hand. Figure 1 illustrates that firms make use of a spiral of knowledge generation 
that helps them to transform information that was generated elsewhere into marketable 
knowledge. Moreover, it may develop into transaction cost-reducing routines. 
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Figure 1: The spiral of knowledge generation 
 
 
Source: Nonaka / Toyama 2002. 
 
Does this new model overcome the existing assumptions about corporate approaches to 
sustainable development and the involvement in governance structures? If the model is 
acknowledged to reflect competitive markets what are the implications for the questions 
outlined here? Basis for an answer is a) our proposition that there is no fixed borderline 
between common and private goods and b) that there are potential low-cost or even profit 
generating options (low-hanging fruits). Basically, knowledge-based firms contribute in two 
respects towards sustainable development while they still serve their own interests: they 
develop technologies and/or services that are private but which contribute to public goals at 
the same time. Renewable energies and technologies for clean water are just a few examples 
(see van Dijken et al. (1999), www.faktor4.org, www.japanfs.org).7 Firms also work on the 
creation of demand, either by marketing or other professional business forms. An illustration 
for this are services like leasing, renting, pooling and sharing of goods that also happen to 
contribute to the commons, e.g. the organisation of car-sharing in order to save costs for 
parking space. 
 
In the context of collective learning, firms can benefit from participation with stakeholders in 
the evolution of new market rules. This is not only due to the fact that they can influence the 
outcome. The main reason is, once again, that there could exist an advantage to be a 
forerunner or fast imitator. The adaptation times for participating firms are significantly 
shorter. Learning during times of governmental policy reforms can trigger competitive 
advantages (Porter / v. d. Linde 2000).8 In other cases, any further regulation has to rely on 
                                                 
7 These two websites provide some expamples from Europe and Japan. 
8 This is a thesis that has not been tested empirically so far but would require more research. To really explain 
the behaviour of actors would require the use of game theory. 
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the experiences gained by pioneering firms because they generate data on the costs and 
benefits of various institutional mechanisms. Thus, such governance systems may well be 
stimulated by exploration and experiments undertaken by corporate actors. The free-riding 
position to simply wait for the establishment of new market rules might turn into a 
competitive disadvantage. Figure 2 presents firms as a part of the social environment where 
the decisions of the firms are likely to be influenced by being embedded into this system of 
rules. 
 
Figure 2: Firms as parts of social environments 
 
 
Source: Nonaka / Toyama 2002. 
 
The tentative conclusion for collective learning is not that the model of the knowledge-based 
firm reflects the only or dominant form of doing business. Many firms struggle to survive and 
hardly spend time with learning processes and exploring new opportunities. Though they may 
be seen as laggards, they are still relevant for an analysis of collective learning processes. One 
also has to take into account that firms do not necessarily act with total consistency. Some 
operations may become more sustainable than others where asset-specific investments that 
imply sunk costs hinder rapid change. We would like to suggest that firms tend to imitate 
pioneers and early followers through benchmarking processes. Incentives for improvements 
are then easier to understand, especially if they come from markets and not only from 
governments or the legislative. These processes of imitation can lead to a horizontal diffusion 
of best practices that is pivotal for sustainable development (see Figure 3 below). 
 
Looking at market evolution overall, transaction costs associated with research and 
development as well as with the establishment of new markets have to be taken into account. 
Markets for sustainability goods involve a multitude of actors. The demand of the consumers 
needs to be stimulated as they only have a vague idea of some of these goods (Loasby 2001). 
Firms, markets and institutions can economise on these transaction costs. Within the 
analytical framework outlined here, this process is characterised by public activities that 
gradually move towards the involvement of viable markets. A point that gains more and more 
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attention by research is that co-evolving incentives set through governance systems are an 
essential prerequisite.9 In terms of market evolution, the following steps can be expected to 
lower transaction costs: 
 
• overcoming information deficits, 
• improving sustainability management within firms, 
• establishing supply chain management among firms (vertical co-operation), 
• involving stakeholders in innovation processes alongside the supply chain, 
• initiating sequences of incremental innovations or more radical innovations like 
functional redesign or system renewal,10 
• promoting horizontal diffusion of innovations. 
 
In some areas emerging markets for sustainability are evident as the case study on wind 
energy in section 5 shows. But how does this apply to other environmental problems such as 
climate protection? Is the climate itself not a truly global public good? This article does not 
seek to argue against open access to, and non-rivalry in consumption of the atmosphere of the 
Earth. However, the proposed thesis on markets for sustainability may open a new perspective 
on the problem of non-excludability. The issue of climate protection is closely linked to 
energy efficiency, increasing shares of renewable energies and hydrogen and growing markets 
for eco-efficiency that act as a substitute for resource-intensive manufacturing processes. 
These markets can be made profitable. The marginal cost functions can be modelled as step-
shaped functions.11 Markets for sustainability produce positive externalities together with a 
learning governance structure. Hence, governance for sustainable development might become 
a positive-sum game: once markets for energy efficiency, renewable energies and eco-
efficiency start to emerge, they can provide public goods or, more precisely, reduce risks and 
contribute to stabilisation of the atmosphere. Ways have to be found to strengthen the 
processes of search, discovery, innovation and diffusion in order to realise such a scenario. 
This is an explicit challenge for firms, stakeholders and governments. Figure 2 (above) 
illustrates the double meaning of the environment: firms act as parts of the natural and social 
environments. Markets for sustainability emerge as a method in order to solve coordination 
problems among different actors, and thereby to provide goods. 
Technological change has a definite bearing on market evolution (Freeman 1998; Langlois / 
Robertson 1995). Discoveries can set the route to cleaner production, more efficient 
manufacturing processes, new products that are able to lower environmental pressure, etc. 
Technological change can result in a shift at the margin from public towards private goods. 
As a consequence, goods formerly considered to be public can now be provided by private 
efforts. For that reason private market activities can at least partly provide a clean 
environment. Firms are interested in these emerging markets as long as they can expect 
profits. Sequences of incremental technological change can stimulate markets just as well as 
                                                 
9 See for example Bleischwitz (2003a, 2003b), Cashore (2002), v. Dijken et al. (1999), Gabel / Sinclair-
Desgagné (1998), Haufler (2001), Héritier (2002), Weizsäcker et al. (1997). 
10 Radical innovations imply higher risks which have to be assessed by the firms itself. This is why firms prefer 
sequences of incremental innovations. 
11 This is still rather a thesis then empirically tested. We argue that this kind of impediments may hinder firms to 
immediately exploit eco-efficiency benefits. For further reading see Jaffe et al. (2002). 
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radical innovations can do. Furthermore, incremental changes are more open to flexible 
incentives provided by other firms, stakeholders and regulatory efforts. This fact is important 
because it proves to be easier to manage changes via improvements in incremental 
technological rather than a backstop technology. Such changes, however, ought to be 
embedded in institutional reforms where government strategies of sustainability act as a 
permanent driving force for markets and firms to search for innovation. 
4. Regulation 
Any governance of sustainability has to deal with various forms of doing business as well as 
with the day-to-day policies of a wide variety of actors. Still, command-and-control 
approaches and other policies exist that restrict businesses in case of permanent non-
compliance or high-risk activities. Our approach of governance becomes especially important 
if long-term tasks are to be performed, e.g. climate protection that requires learning, 
innovation and change. For such tasks, innovation-inducing regulation (Jänicke / Jacob 2002) 
fits into our conceptual framework. This type of regulation is not only conducive to 
innovation but develops also alongside with the specific developments in each case. Such co-
evolution between corporate and political actors is based on the insight that important 
governance functions have to be dealt with at the level of day-to-day governance. They cannot 
completely be regulated ex-ante by any political or constitutional order. The reasons for this 
are uncertainties, knowledge deficits and, by and large, the unpredictable results from human 
activity. One may note that these uncertainties result from different sources: previously 
unknown facts and the persistence of market failures that are more difficult to overcome than 
previously expected. For this reason, innovation-inducing regulation interacts with corporate 
activities and the emergence of new markets for sustainability. In contrast to Jänicke and 
Jacob (2002), who put great emphasis on political actors, we would argue in favour of 
collective learning that leads to change. This view of co-evolution has more far-reaching 
implications than the analysis of Jänicke and Jacob (2002) reveals. 
 
Innovation-inducing regulation has a relatively short time horizon up to a few years. On the 
other hand, strategic frameworks have an impact over many years if not decades. Innovation-
inducing regulation relates to the governmental functions of addressing problems of the 
society, bringing together heterogeneous actors and finding solutions for specific problems. 
At the same time, this type of regulation takes into account that governments do not 
necessarily have the knowledge of what exactly can be done. The governments first draw 
business attention to certain problems instead of telling them what to do. Governments set 
goals and help to establish win-win coalitions, but they do not specify which action should be 
taken. They participate in networks and other forms of multi-actor coalitions without being in 
a dominant position. There is a shift in the process of policy-making from public policy-
makers to a multitude of other actors that include corporate actors and environmental and/or 
social NGOs. Corporate governance and the notion of knowledge-based firms fit well into 
such a comprehensive governance system. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates this view. It basically shows that policies and management develop 
through different stages, from immediate problem solving, via institutionalisation to low-cost, 
innovative and preventive approaches. The meaning of governance is twofold: Firstly, each 
stage serves a certain function and any institutional leapfrogging strategy may come at the 
expense of comprehensiveness and of the major actors. Secondly, any progress depends on 
11 
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co-evolution, not only on success in policy or management. There is hardly a country in the 
world where eco-efficient services (stage 4 in environmental management in the figure below) 
emerge without incentives being set by governments. Neither is it easy to find a country 
where horizontal coordination among ministries and institutional adaptation improves 
flexibility (stages 3 and 4 in environmental policy) without support from vested or newly 
established interest groups. 
 
Fig. 3: Co-Evolution of Corporate and Political Governance 
 
 
 
Source: Bleischwitz 2003a. 
 
This figure suggests that participatory and administrative processes in governments and 
businesses increasingly fulfill important governance functions were previously which the 
prerogative of a political framework. Stabilisation not only results from a framework but also 
from the adaptation towards new conditions. The importance of adaptive flexibility increases 
with the degree of uncertainty and change. For governance that aims at long-term changes 
with varied innovations, adaptive flexibility is at least as relevant as an ex-ante framework. 
This implies a kind of regulation that is not determined by a rigid framework. It precludes 
strict regulation that would stifle the adaptive flexibility of markets and societies. Such 
criteria should play a role when the European Union employs ‘Sustainability Impact 
Assessment’ in support of its policies. 
5. A case study: developing Dutch, German and Swedish wind turbine 
industries 
The development of the wind turbine industries in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany 
illustrates the governance approach we suggest. The German wind turbine industry is now the 
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second largest in the world. The Dutch and Swedish industries only account for very low 
shares of the world market. These outcomes can be explained by the development of different 
public and private relations and collective learning processes. Johnson and Jacobson (2000) 
see two phases in the different development paths of the German, Dutch and Swedish 
industries. The first phase, roughly between 1975 and 1989, was characterised by substantial 
technological variety (and uncertainty), underdevelopment of markets and entry of many 
firms. The second phase, roughly between 1990 and 1999, was characterised by a 
considerable turbulence, driven by rapid growth in the market and an up-scaling of turbines. 
Further, there were many exits and some new entrants including a few larger firms (Johnson 
and Jacobson 2002:7). The differences in the institutional frameworks, both in the first and 
the second phase, can be seen as a central factor explaining the different evolution of the 
emerging industries in the three countries. 
 
At the end of the 1980s, a large number of actors, firms and universities developed and tried 
out a range of different technological designs both in Germany and in the Netherlands. In both 
countries R&D policies encouraged a broad range of technical experiments that stimulated the 
creation of new knowledge. In contrast, the funding policies in Sweden were directed towards 
large turbines (MW sized) and did not support small and medium sized turbines. At the same 
time only a few large firms were involved in the development of the wind turbine industry. 
Therefore, a great variety in the industry was developed in Germany and the Netherlands with 
respect to the generated knowledge and the exploration of it. In contrast, the variety of the 
technology and the existence of actors in the Swedish industry were low. Only one firm was 
mainly involved in the development of knowledge and was merely focused on large turbines. 
 
The German market expanded rapidly due to the market formation programme, which 
included significant subsidies lowering the price of wind electricity (Assmann et al.2004). 
The price regulation for renewable electricity was based on fixed enumeration prices 
established by law, independent from public budgets. These enumeration prices declined over 
time and were financed by a small charge on electricity use. In a legal sense it is not a kind of 
eco-tax. Therefore, the income that was generated by wind turbines was high and predictable 
and greatly reduced the risk of the investment. Another cause for the rapid expansion of the 
German market was the fact that it was required by a federal law of 1997 to provide land to 
build wind turbines, and hence compulsory for the different federal states (Länder). The 
German wind turbine industry witnessed at the same time the development of two forms of 
networks that made the market formation possible. Firstly, learning networks that facilitated 
the diffusion of wind turbines developed between the different actors in the product chain of 
wind turbine technology. Secondly, policy networks were created that actively took part in 
protecting German wind energy policies within the German wind turbine industry. Large 
energy companies particularly demanded these networks. 
 
The market formation in the Netherlands failed because of other reasons. The investment 
subsidies from the Dutch government did not have the intended effect. One reason was a 
problem of finding sites for wind turbines. The building permits were issued by local 
authorities, which forced a lot of local resistance (NIMBY), in turn exploiting slow and time 
consuming procedures. This blocked the formation of the Dutch market. The failure of the 
Windplan foundation, which was organised by several Dutch electricity distributors, is 
another cause of the failure of the formation of the Dutch market. The idea behind the project 
was to coordinate procurement and thereby acquire cheaper and better wind turbines. The 
project was ambitious at that time (measure in MW) and also attracted foreign firms. 
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However, the project of the Windplan foundation was abandoned in a very late stage of the 
project phase because the electricity distributors started to question the benefits from joint 
procurement. Further, the Windplan foundation is seen as a central reason why the Dutch 
wind industry failed to acquire shares of the expanding German market. The Dutch industry 
concentrated on the domestic market because it looked very promising. Although the opinions 
on this matter do not concur, it is also argued that technical requirements of the Windplan 
project made the Dutch industry develop a wind technology that followed (too) specific 
requirements. However, these requirements were not commercially feasible with respect to 
other markets. “Without access to a booming market and the associated economic benefits, 
the Dutch firms had neither the resources to develop their technology fast enough or to keep 
up with the German suppliers nor the political strength to influence the vital building permit 
issue” (Johnson and Jacobson 2002:28). 
 
No virtuous circles for the industry were engineered in Sweden although a growth in demand 
developed. An important reason for the former was that potential industrial partners were not 
interested. The Swedish wind industry therefore lacked resources in the development of new 
technology and market shares. There were investment subsidies within the facilitation of the 
Swedish market, even though they were much weaker than in Germany and the Netherlands. 
The Swedish firms lacked a strong response capacity in the second phase due to the low 
technology variety during the first phase. This became a second reason causing the failure of 
the market formation. 
 
According to Johnson and Jacobson (2000), the level of legitimacy of the new technology 
enjoyed by public and private actors is a central explanation in the analysis of the different 
evolutions of the wind turbine industry in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany. The 
legitimacy of a new technology and new ideas can be seen as a part of learning processes 
where actors develop new understandings and perceptions of human life and market 
opportunities. In this context, the absence of an interest of potential industrial partners within 
the Swedish industry was connected to lack of legitimacy of wind power that came due the 
so-called nuclear trauma.12 On the other hand, a political consensus existed in the Netherlands 
and Germany in the 1980s that the wind turbine industry should be supported. It was seen as 
legitimate for private capital to exploit wind turbine technology. “The legitimacy meant that 
firms responded to various stimuli, e.g. the Californian ‘boom’, R&D programmes etc., by 
diversifying into wind turbines or by starting new firms” (Johnson and Jacobson 2002:32). 
Interestingly, the authors find that the low legitimacy in Sweden caused weak responses by 
Swedish firms to the very same stimuli that made German firms invest. In addition, the 
Californian ‘boom’ did not inspire Swedish firms to the same extent as in the other two 
countries. 
 
The Dutch government did not find a solution for the problem of the establishment of 
locations for wind turbines.13 Johnson and Jacobson (2000) associate this with the fact that the 
                                                 
12 Johnson and Jacobson (2000) use the term nuclear trauma to describe the entrenchment of the Swedish 
nuclear power debate (pro versus con). Any interest in wind power is automatically taken as being against 
nuclear power. This was seen as a betrayal by the Swedish industry that benefited the cheap nuclear power. 
13 One has to note that the Netherlands is the most densely populated country in the world, which at the same 
time struggles with complicated water management and large areas below sea level. Thus, land-owning policies 
have a long and strict tradition for many reasons. One cannot expect these policies to be lifted just for new huge 
windmills. It is typical that a new surge in windmill policy is based on windmill parks in the North Sea. We 
thank Jacques Pelkmans for this comment. 
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political support for the Dutch wind industry failed in the second phase. This lack of political 
support is also reflected by the fact that even after the Dutch market formation failed no more 
powerful political measures were taken. The German industry benefited from the highest 
legitimacy, reflected in well-designed incentives and in creative corporate networks and in 
demand. 
 
A crucial factor to explain the evolution of the Dutch, German and Swedish wind turbine 
industries was that the ideas and interests of the three national industries were embedded. A 
decisive impact on co-operation preparedness, the developed policies, the technology and 
knowledge generation and the market formation, consisted in the perception of these 
emerging industries by public and private actors. The case of the wind turbine industry 
concurrently illustrates the relationship of collective learning between the government and the 
market mechanisms in the development of new sustainable markets. It further shows what 
happens if both parties fail to co-operate. At the same time, this case shows the important 
function of governments in setting the institutional frame for knowledge generation between 
public and private actors. Finally, the expansion of the wind turbine industry in Germany and 
the development of economic and political networks illustrate the specific dynamics of 
sustainable markets. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Governance in the pursuit of sustainability, as described in the present article, reveals its 
greatest strength where long-term innovatory tasks with low immediate damage potential are 
pursued. Such processes usually result in new coalitions and the formulation of new rules of 
the game. Areas of application are climate change policies (beyond the need of the 
management of specific impacts), eco-efficiency policies, water policies, provision of 
collective goods, etc. 
 
In contrast to many other approaches, our conceptual framework on collective learning 
processes welcomes the self-interest of business as a beneficial force. The self-interest of 
private business may prompt companies to move beyond the exploitation of low-hanging 
fruits. Instead, it may seek to promote the creation of new knowledge because business 
recognises the changing market expectations and the resulting needs for a market evolution. 
Of course, business can opt out of the collective learning processes if profits fall short of the 
expectations. The function of governance is thus to support processes of mutual learning 
where the governments are in a strong but not (too) dominant position. This function extends 
well beyond the usual compliance procedures. 
 
Network institutions for collective learning between private and public actors are essential in 
order to correct market and government failures within the evolution of sustainable markets. 
The provision of collective goods and the internalisation of externalities can gradually shift to 
co-evolutionary processes managed by both private and public actors, in marked contrast to 
the conventional idea that that such activities a core competence of governments. 
 
Our analytical framework for corporate action combines elements of new institutional 
economics, evolutionary economics and actor-centred institutionalism. We would like to 
claim that the overall framework seems to be consistent and well suited for the analysis of the 
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evolution of the Dutch, German and Swedish wind turbine industries. We expect it to be 
useful for various other case studies in the EU in the long search for sustainability. 
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